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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-PROOF OF CORPUS DELICTI
BY CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Six days after birth the illegitimate son of defendant, who
was alone and unattended at the time of the birth, died under
dubious circumstances. Defendant shared a two-party telephone
line with a witness who testified that she heard accused state in
a telephone conversation with her paramour that she did not
want the baby, that she had to get rid of it, and that she was
going to throw it into the furnace. Upon investigation, the
police procured from defendant a signed written statement that
she had placed the body of her son in the furnace; however, the
body was later discovered in a vacant field. Accused was mis-
leading and, also evasive in other ways; nevertheless she denied
any responsibility for the death of her child. The chief medical
examiner for the county stated in his testimony with respect to
his autopsic examination, "My diagnosis was asphyxia, probably
due to smothering, suffocation," while a pathologist, presented
as a witness on behalf of the defense, testified that in his opinion
the child "probably died of a fulminating respiratory disease."
The defendant was convicted of second degree murder. On ap-
peal, held, affirmed. The circumstantial evidence was sufficient
to substantiate the verdict. Opanowich v. Commonwealth, 196
Va. 342, 83 S.E.2d 432 (1954) (Whittle, J., dissenting).
To sustain a conviction for crime, it devolves upon the state
to prove the corpus delicti-the fact that the crime charged has
been actually perpetrated-as a material element of the offense.1
"In every criminal prosecution there are two fundamental and
essential facts to be established: First, that the party alleged to
have been murdered is dead; and, second, that the death was
brought about by the criminal agency of another."2 In other
words, "the corpus delicti has two components; death as the re-
sult, and the criminal agency of another as the means."3
The argument against the conviction of the defendant, which
was stressed by Justice Whittle in his dissenting opinion, is based
1 5 Michie's Jurisprudence, Criminal Procedure §54 (1949); see also Note, 103 1J.Pa.L.
Rev. 638 (1955).
5 Bowie v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 381: 388, 35 S.E.2d 345. 348 (1945).
a Terry v. Commonwealth, 171 Va. 505, 508, 198 S.E. 911, 913 (1938).
on the rule that the coincidence of circumstances tending to indi-
cate guilt, however strong and numerous they may be, avails
nothing unless the corpus delicti be first established. So long as
the least doubt exists as to the criminal act, the question of
criminal agency cannot even arise.4 There was conflicting medi-
cal testimony as to the cause of death; the medical examiner
merely stated that the cause was "probably" due to asphyxiation;
and even conceding this, it would be a reasonable hypothesis that
the infant smothered in his bedclothing. "A citizen should not
be deprived of his liberty or his life on a mere possibility."
5
Further, it has been contended that the conduct of the accused
was unjustly utilized to establish the corpus delicti, that in affirm-
ing the conviction the Court permitted the criminal agency to
be proved and then assumed the criminal act.8
It must be borne in mind that the issue before the Court was
not whether the corpus delicti had been established, but whether
the jury could have found, with full assurance of moral certainty,
that it had been proved from the evidence presented by the
Commonwealth. "It is for the court to determine whether there
is sufficient testimony to make it appear prima facie that a crime
has been committed, and if there is no evidence of the corpus
delicti, the court may properly so hold; but whether the corpus
delicti has been proved is a question of fact for the jury."'
"Direct evidence is not essential to prove the corpus delicti
in any case. It may be proved as any other fact may be proved
which is essential to establish the guilt of the accused, namely,
by circumstantial evidence which produces the full assurance
of moral certainty on the subject."s "While circumstantial evi-,
dence must always be scanned with great caution, it is sufficient
where all the circumstances of time, place, motive, means, oppor-
tunity and conduct, concur in pointing out the accused as the
perpetrator of the crime; it must produce a moral, if not absolute,
certainty of his guilt."9 It is not necessary that the evidence
eliminate every possibility of the cause of death; the criminal
4 5 Michie's Jurisprudence, Criminal Procedure §54 (1949).
'Terry v. Commonwealth, 171 Va.. 505, 509, 198 S.E. 911, 913 (1938).
* Recent Decisions, 40 Va.L.Rev. 1109 (1954).
'23 C.J.S., Criminal Law §1124 (1940).
U Nicholas v. Commonwealth. 91 Va. 741 750. 21 S.E 364 367 (1895).
Dean v. Commonwealth 32 Gratt. (73 Va.) 912, 924 (1859); accord., Toler v. Com-
monwealth, 188 Va. 774, 51 S.E.2d 210 (1949).
agency as well as the identity of the agent may be established by
circumstantial evidence.10 Nor does the criminal act have to be
proved before circumstantial evidence will be admissible. If
this contention were sound, "there could never be a conviction
upon circumstantial evidence."11 It is the duty of the state to
present evidence of all the surrounding facts and circumstances
having any bearing upon the manner of death and any tendency
to show whether it was natural, accidental, or felonious. The
jury should be given as complete a picture as possible of all the
surrounding circumstances, irrespective of any question of sub-
sequently connecting the defendant with the transaction by other
proof. Such proof is a necessary preliminary to any evidence
offered to connect a particular person with the homicide. 12
"In all cases of circumstantial evidence the conduct of the
accused is always an important factor in the estimate of the
weight of circumstances which point to his guilt."13 Had the
accused in the case under comment conducted herself in a more
savory manner, her conviction might have been reversed. She at
first maintained that the baby was deformed, but after the body
was found and the coroner testified as to its normal condition,
she testified that she did not remember whether it was deformed
or not. She was "evasive, confusing and misleading" 14 when
examined as to her conversations with her paramour. When
asked if she remembered saying she placed the baby in the fur-
nace, she replied, "'Ihe word 'furnace' means a great deal in this
case, and you are leading yourself into it." In this case there is
more than the slight or insignificant conflict in testimony to be
expected from one who is affronted with the possibility of being
deprived of his life or freedom.
It is conceded that the jury could have reasonably found for
the defendant on the basis of the evidence presented; but it is
submitted that the telephone conversation and medical evidence,
together with the conduct of the accused, fully justified the
Court in holding that the jury properly found that the evidence
7Orange v. Commonwealth 191 Va. 423, 434, 61 S.E.2d 267 271 (1M).
11 Nicholas v. Commonwealth, 91 Va. 741, 750, 21 S.E. 364. 67 (1895).
"Annot.. 159 A.L.R. 523, 524 (1945).
"Bowie v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 381, 391, 35 S.E.2d 345. 349 (1945); accord, Dean
V. Commonwealth, 32 Gratt. (73 Va.) 774 (1879);. Toler v. Commonwealth, 188 Va.
14774, 51 S.E.2d 210 (1949)
Opanowich v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 342, 350, 83 S.K.2d 432, 437 (1954).
presented by the Commonwealth was sufficient to establish the
fact that the criminal act had been committed.
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